DEBOLDBENJAMIN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/12/2011 11:29 AM

ESSAY

“LOSING GROUND”—IN SEARCH OF A REMEDY FOR THE
OVEREMPHASIS ON LOSS AND OTHER CULPABILITY FACTORS
IN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR FRAUD AND THEFT

†

DAVID DEBOLD AND MATTHEW BENJAMIN

††

INTRODUCTION
In 2010, fraud offenses were the third largest portion of the fed1
eral criminal docket, trailing only immigration and drug offenses.
And yet, the strong criticisms of the primary advisory guideline governing the sentencing of those offenses, U.S. Sentencing Guideline
2
§ 2B1.1, remain unaddressed. Judges, defense lawyers, and commentators have long called for a reassessment of § 2B1.1’s “inordi3
nate emphasis” on the amount of loss caused by an offense. Even

†
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Practitioners Advisory Group. The views he expresses here are in his individual capacity.
††
Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.
1
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig. A (2010); see also Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 19 (2011) (statement of Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission) [hereinafter Saris
Testimony],
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/
Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf.
2
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2011).
3
United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also, e.g.,
Frank O. Bowman III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED.
SENT’G REP. 167, 169 (2008) (“In sum, since Booker, virtually every judge faced with a
top-level corporate defendant in a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called
for by the Guidelines were too high.”); Alan Ellis et al., At a “Loss” for Justice: Federal
Sentencing for Economic Offenses, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 34, 35 (“In short, the increasingly complex fraud guideline is rapidly becoming a mess.”); James E. Felman, The

(141)

DEBOLDBENJAMIN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

142

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

12/12/2011 11:29 AM

[Vol. 160:141

the other major participant in the sentencing process—the Department of Justice (DOJ)—has called for a comprehensive review of the
4
economic crimes guideline.
The staggering increases in sentence ranges driven by the amount
5
6
of loss, combined with largely duplicative sentencing enhancements,
have escalated advisory guidelines sentences for high-loss frauds
beyond those once reserved for violent criminals. Indeed, the memorandum opposing the government’s request to imprison Raj Rajaratnam for between 235 and 293 months (approximately 19.5 to 24.5
years) noted that the “average sentence imposed for manslaughter in
2010 was 73 months; for kidnapping and hostage-taking, 163 months;
for sexual abuse, 109 months; for robbery, 77 months; for arson, 79
7
months, and for child pornography, 118 months.” On October 13,
2011, Rajaratnam received a sentence of 132 months (11 years) in pris8
on, the longest term ever imposed for insider trading, though it pales
9
in comparison to sentences imposed in other recent fraud cases.

Need to Reform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for High-Loss Economic Crimes, 23 FED. SENT’G.
REP. 138, 139 (2010) (describing the current high-loss guidelines as “overkill”).
4
See Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 112th Cong. 2, 4 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Preet
Bharara, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20110216/Testimony_DOJ_%20Bharara.pdf; Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director, Office of Policy and Legislation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable William
K. Sessions III, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 4-5 ( June 28, 2010) [hereinafter
Wroblewski Letter] (recommending reform of the economic crimes guideline due to
significant variances at the district court level), reprinted in 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 282
(2011); see also infra text accompanying note 45.
5
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1).
6
See id. § 2B1.1(b)(10) (increasing sentence where defendant used “sophisticated
means”); see also James Felman & Mary Price, Out-of-Control Fraud Guidelines, NAT’L L.J.,
July 25, 2011, at 43, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?
id=1202504720046&slreturn=1 (describing redundant sentencing enhancements as
one of the major weaknesses of the fraud guidelines).
7
Reply Sentencing Memorandum for Defendant at 2, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-1184 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2011), 2011 WL 4021121 [hereinafter Rajaratnam Sent’g Memo.].
8
See Peter Lattman, 11 Years in Jail for Fund Chief in Stock Deals, N.Y. T IMES,
Oct. 14, 2011, at A1.
9
For example, on September 16, 2011—less than one month before Rajaratnam’s
sentencing—Judge James Lawrence King of the Southern District of Florida imposed
the longest sentence ever given to a Medicare fraud offender, sentencing Lawrence
Duran, the president of American Therapeutic Corp., to fifty years imprisonment. Duran’s co-conspirator Marianella Valera received a sentence of thirty-five years. Jay
Weaver, Judge Sends Therapist to Prison for 35 Years in Massive Medicare-Fraud Case, MIAMI
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The severity of loss-driven sentences has provoked significant judicial criticism of the economic crimes guideline, memorably derided
by Judge Frederick Block in United States v. Parris as “a black stain on
10
common sense.” Employing their discretion to “vary” from the advisory guidelines range based on policy disagreements, federal judges
have increasingly imposed non-government-sponsored below-range
11
variances in fraud cases since Booker. These variances are part of an
escalating attack on the rationality of the economic crimes guideline.
In Part I, we trace briefly the history of various amendments to the
economic crimes guideline, which quickly ratcheted up both the
prominence of loss as a sentencing input and the severity of sentences
generally. In Part II, we describe the recent mounting pressure on the
U.S. Sentencing Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of
the economic crimes guideline, and the scuttling of those efforts. In
Part III, we explore the economic crimes guideline’s overemphasis on
loss and the pernicious consequences of that overemphasis. In Part
IV, we propose a series of targeted remedies that would help in the effort to rebalance the various sentencing inputs for economic crimes.
I.

HOW WE GOT HERE

The development of the economic crimes guideline has been
12
fully chronicled elsewhere, and we therefore trace that history only
briefly, focusing in particular on the inconsistency and irrationality
underlying the Commission’s insistent upward ratcheting in re13
sponse to political pressure.
When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it
specifically directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines that
HERALD, Sept. 19, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/19/
2414969/judge-sends-therapist-to-prison.html.
That same day, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the hotly contested
twenty-seven-year sentence of Sholom Rubashkin, who was convicted for numerous
frauds causing a calculated $27 million loss. United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849,
855 (8th Cir. 2011). Rubashkin’s sentence fell at the low end of the guideline range. Id.
10
United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
11
Saris Testimony, supra note 1, at 7 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005)).
12
See generally Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373 (2004).
13
See, e.g., Rajaratnam Sent’g Memo., supra note 7, at 8 (arguing that the
guidelines for economic crimes tend “to yield these unduly severe sentences because they have been repeatedly stiffened in response to political pressure instead
of empirical research”).
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14

met the “purposes of sentencing” and to use as a “starting point” the
15
average sentences actually served during the pre-guidelines period.
The original Commission could not agree on which sentencing purposes should predominate, however, and instead purportedly based
the guidelines exclusively on the latter, empirical approach. But the
fraud guideline was an exception even to that compromise. According to Justice Breyer, the original Commission, of which he was a
member, abandoned “the touchstone of prior past practice” with re16
spect to economic crimes. Instead, the Commission decided to require short but certain periods of confinement for all but the least serious offenders, generally exceeding the average penalties imposed in
17
the pre-guidelines period for economic crimes.
Merely two years after the promulgation of the initial 1987 guidelines, the Commission enhanced penalties again by revising the loss
18
table. Though the Commission justified the change by invoking the
goals of “provid[ing] additional deterrence and better reflect[ing] the
19
seriousness of the conduct,” a former commissioner and a former
deputy chief counsel complained that the increases were motivated by
pressure from the DOJ and grounded in “overtly political and inex20
pert” reasons. Between 1989 and 2001, the Commission promulgated several aggravating specific offense characteristics, many of which
duplicated the factors for which loss alone had previously “served as a
14

See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2006).
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006).
16
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 23 (1988).
17
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (1987); id. ch. 1, pt. A, 4(d)
(2011) (providing for “at least a short period of imprisonment in [economic crime]
cases”); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 56 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN-YEAR
REPORT] (noting the shift from probation to incarceration for economic crimes during the guidelines period).
18
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amends. 99, 154 (1989). The
amendments to the loss tables for theft and fraud imposed higher offense levels starting at loss amounts of more than $40,000 and added four more loss ranges at the top
of the table. Thus, for example, the enhancement for a fraud loss of more than
$800,000 went from eight levels to eleven, and the largest loss amount (more than
$80,000,000) would now receive an enhancement of eighteen offense levels instead of
eleven levels. The stated reasons for the amendments—“to conform the theft and
fraud loss tables to the tax evasion table”—demonstrates how efforts to get tough on
one offense have ripple effects. See id. amend. 154.
19
Id.
20
Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing Commission, P.M. (PostMistretta): Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 320 (1989).
15
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21

rough proxy.” And in 2001, the Commission’s multi-year review of
the sentences for fraud and theft culminated in the merging of three
guidelines—§ 2F1.1 (fraud), § 2B1.1 (theft/embezzlement), and
§ 2B3.1 (property destruction)—into one guideline, § 2B1.1, with a
22
more severe loss table.
These increased penalties were based, in
part, on an ill-guided effort to create rough parity with the drug
guidelines, which themselves lacked empirical basis and were dictated
by mandatory minimum sentences over which the Commission had no
23
input or control.
A series of major corporate and accounting scandals—Enron,
Adelphia, WorldCom, Tyco—followed close on the heels of these
“economic crimes package” amendments and generated inevitable
pressure to “do something.” Choosing to ignore the “something” that
the Commission had just done—making a substantial change to the
economic crimes guideline that would soon result in much higher
sentences in fraud cases—Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
24
2002, which raised statutory maximums for most fraud offenses.
Reacting to directives in the Act and pressure from the DOJ, the
Commission then raised the base offense level from six to seven for
defendants convicted of an offense with a statutory maximum of twen-

21

Bowman, supra note 3, at 170; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
app. C, amend. 317 (1990) (increasing the sentence if the “offense substantially jeopardized . . . a financial institution”); id. amend. 551 (1997) (increasing the sentence if
the offense involved misappropriation of a trade secret and the defendant knew it
would benefit a foreign state); id. amend. 576 (1998) (increasing the sentence if the
“offense involved theft of property from a national cemetery”); id. amend. 596 (2000)
(increasing the sentence if the offense involved, inter alia, trafficking devices or unauthorized transfer of identification). By way of example, the initial fraud guideline, §
2F1.1, included two specific offense characteristics in addition to loss, one with four
subparts applicable in the alternative and one that required a floor of twelve levels. See
id. § 2F1.1 (1987). If there was “more than minimal planning” and “more than one
victim,” one two-level enhancement applied. Today, § 2B1.1 has seventeen specific offense characteristics in addition to the loss table, and many have multiple alternatives.
See id. § 2B1.1(b) (2011). “Sophisticated means” and “250 or more victims” produce a
cumulative eight-level enhancement. Id. at § 2B1.1(b)(2), (b)(10).
22
Id. app. C, amend. 617 (2001). The new loss table used two-level increments
rather than one-level, and increased the penalties at numerous loss amounts. Id.
Moreover, the amendment revised the definition of “actual loss” to include “reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm,” much like the broader, civil definition. Id.
23
See generally Hon. Joe Kendall, Remarks at U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Symposium
Panel on the Nature and Severity of Punishment for Economic Crimes: Determinants
of Offense Seriousness and Offender Culpability 54-69 (Oct. 12, 2000).
24
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). See generally Bowman, supra note 12, at 373.
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25

ty years. More importantly, the newly revised guideline also substan26
tially increased the prominence of loss and other aggravating factors.
II. CALLS FOR COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
A. The DOJ’s and Congress’s Responses to Judicial Criticism
In a trio of decisions from 2005 to 2007, the Supreme Court ren27
dered the guidelines advisory, established a deferential standard for
28
appellate review, and authorized judges to reject the Commission’s
29
policy judgments in certain circumstances. Exercising this newfound
discretion to vary from the guidelines, several judges have taken aim
30
at the economic crimes guideline. By 2008, one prominent commentator observed that, since Booker:
virtually every judge faced with a top-level corporate fraud defendant in
a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called for by the Guidelines were too high. This near unanimity suggests that the judiciary sees a
consistent disjunction between the sentences prescribed by the Guidelines
[in corporate fraud cases] and the fundamental requirement of Section
3553(a) that judges impose sentences “sufficient, but not greater than ne31
cessary” to comply with its objectives.
25

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 653 (2003).
Specifically, the loss table was extended by two additional brackets, and enhancements for “officer/director,” “company insolvency,” and “more than 250 victims”
were added. Id. amends. 647 & 653.
27
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
28
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007) (“The uniqueness of the individual case, however, does not change the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of
review that applies to all sentencing decisions.”).
29
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007). The Court has reaffirmed
this line of authority in subsequent decisions. See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
1229, 1236 (2011) (rejecting an argument that the sentencing court must use the
“same percentage departure[s]” as the guidelines recommend); Spears v. United
States, 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009) (permitting virtually any variance if based on the
individualized features of the case).
30
See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (imposing a term of five years where the guidelines range suggested thirty years to life, and
explicitly criticizing the economic crimes guideline); United States v. Adelson, 441 F.
Supp. 2d 506, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding a guidelines sentence in a securities fraud
case so outrageous that the judge had to rely on other factors); United States v. Mueffelman, 400 F. Supp. 2d 368, 377-78 (D. Mass. 2005) (arguing that total loss should be
a contingent factor, not absolute); see also United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp.
2d 416, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (weighing factors outside of the guidelines calculations
during sentencing in a securities fraud case).
31
Bowman, supra note 3, at 169 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553).
26
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In its June 2010 annual report to the Commission, the Department of Justice responded to this phenomenon. Observing the existence of “certain offense types for which the guidelines have lost the
respect of a large number of judges,” the Department’s ex-officio representative on the Commission, Jonathan Wroblewski, called for a
comprehensive review of, and possible amendments to, those guide32
lines. Wroblewski then specifically cited two guidelines “that have
lost the backing of a large part of the judiciary”: the guidelines for
33
child pornography possession offenses and fraud offenses.
With respect to the economic crimes guideline, Wroblewski decried the increasing frequency of district courts sentencing “fraud offenders—especially high-loss fraud offenders—inconsistently and
34
without regard to the federal sentencing guidelines.” The letter did
35
not move far beyond “handwringing,” however : after declaring “current sentencing outcomes” to be “unacceptable,” Wroblewski called
on the Commission to “determine whether some reforms are needed.
Such reforms might include amendments to the sentencing guideline
for fraud offenses, recommendations for new statutory penalties, or
36
other policy changes.”
Responses to the Wroblewski letter varied. Testifying before the
Commission on behalf of the American Bar Association, James Felman speculated that the “reference to ‘new statutory penalties’ is presumably intended to suggest mandatory minimum penalties for cer37
Professor Frank Bowman noted a
tain economic offenses.”
“dramatic change in tone,” suggesting that the “DOJ recognizes the
problem they’ve got in the fraud area is the guidelines have become
disconnected from reality, at least at the top end, for high-loss, corpo38
rate official-type sentences.” And in a stinging rejoinder, Judge John
Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York suggested that the De32

Wroblewski Letter, supra note 4, at 2-3; see also Marcia Coyle, DOJ Wants Sentences
Examined; Prosecutors See Disparity in Fraud, Child Pornography Punishments, NAT’L L.J.,
July 19, 2010, at 21, 25 (quoting former federal judge Paul Cassell as stating, “I think
they’re conceding judges have lost confidence in those guidelines for good reason—
they’re mindlessly draconian in some situations.”).
33
Wroblewski Letter, supra note 4, at 3.
34
Id. at 4.
35
United States v. Ovid, No. 09-0216, 2010 WL 3940724, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010).
36
Wroblewski Letter, supra note 4, at 5.
37
Hearings, supra note 4, at 12 (statement of James E. Felman on behalf of the American Bar Association), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Testimony_ABA_%20Felman.pdf.
38
Coyle, supra note 32, at 25 (quoting Professor Bowman).
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partment had failed to avail itself of a clear solution to the “‘unac39
ceptable’ outcomes [it] complain[ed] about”: appellate review.
Noting that prosecutors had appealed only 18 of the 1711 nongovernment-sponsored below-range variances imposed in fiscal year
2009, Judge Gleeson questioned why the Department had “chosen to
complain about fraud sentences to the Commission but not to the
40
circuit courts of appeals.”
At a time when even the Department recognized that some
change in direction was needed, it continued to be business as usual
at Congress. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro41
42
tection Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
both passed in 2010, directed the Commission to revisit the penalties
for health care fraud, securities fraud, and bank fraud. Dodd-Frank’s
instruction was general: the Commission must ensure that the penalties for securities fraud and bank fraud fully reflect “the serious nature
of [those] offenses,” the “need for an effective deterrent and appropriate punishment to prevent [those] offenses,” and “the effectiveness
43
The health care
of incarceration in furthering” those objectives.
reform law, on the other hand, mandated a more aggressive, burdenshifting definition of “intended loss” and specific new offense-level increases—applicable only to fraud involving government health care
44
programs—for higher loss amounts. In neither Act did Congress
explain why existing penalties for health care fraud, securities fraud,
and bank fraud are insufficient, nor was it evident why health care
fraud, which only rarely victimizes individuals, should be treated more
severely than every other fraud.
B. Ready, Set . . . No
Given the appeals from a diverse group of stakeholders, including
the DOJ, for something more than a piecemeal reaction to congress-

39

Ovid, 2010 WL 3940724, at *2.
Id. at *9.
41
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1079A, 124 Stat. 1376, 2077 (2010) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
42
See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606, 124 Stat. 119, 1006 (2010) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
43
§ 1079A (a)(1)(B)(i), 124 Stat. at 2078.
44
§ 10606(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1007. This amendment threatens to shift the
burden to the defendant of disproving intended loss, even in cases involving “upcoding,” false certification, or other instances where billing was submitted for services actually rendered. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 9 (statement of James E. Felman).
40
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ional directives that nibble around the edges, many entered this calendar year cautiously optimistic that the Commission would launch a
comprehensive, multi-year review of the economic crimes guideline.
Early signs were promising. In its January 2011 Notice of Proposed Amendments, the Commission responded to the directives contained in Dodd-Frank by announcing the possibility of a comprehensive, multi-year review:
[T]he Commission is considering conducting a more comprehensive review of § 2B1.1 and related guidelines, not only of the specific offense characteristics referred to in the directives (§ 2B1.1(b)(14) and
(17)), but also of certain other aspects of the guidelines (e.g., the loss table and the definition of loss; the victims table and the definition of victim;
45
and the interactions between these tables and definitions).

The following month, at a public hearing on proposed amendments for 2011, a broad cross-section of witnesses, including United
States Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York,
46
supported such a review. And in March 2011, the Commission re47
ceived comment letters favoring it.

45

Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements,
and Commentary, 76 Fed. Reg. 3193, 3201 ( Jan. 19, 2011).
46
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Preet Bharara) (“As we have
stated before, the Department fully supports the Commission’s plan for a thorough
review of the federal sentencing guidelines that relate to fraud offenses generally as
well as to securities, bank, and mortgage fraud offenses in particular.”); id. at 2 (statement of Hector Dopico, Supervisory Assistant, Federal Public Defender for the Southern District of Florida, Federal Public and Community Defenders), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20110216/Testimony_FPD_Dopico.pdf (“Given the complexity of the fraud guidelines,
and the wide variety of circumstances involving frauds on Government health care
programs, we believe that the Commission should undertake a comprehensive review
of the fraud guideline in general and health care fraud offenses specifically.”); id. at 1
(statement of Susan Howley, Director, Public Policy and Victims Services, National
Center for Victims of Crime), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Testimony_VAG_Howley_
Panel_II.pdf (“We urge the Commission to undertake a broad review of §2B1.1, not
only with an eye to the Dodd-Frank Act, but to reconsider sentencing for serious
property offenses.”); id. at 3 (statement of Eric A. Tirschwell, Practitioners Advisory
Group), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_
Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Testimony_PAG_Tirschwell.pdf (“We encourage
the Commission to undertake the comprehensive review of § 2B1.1 that the Proposed Amendments say the Commission is considering.”).
47
See, e.g., Letter from Jim E. Lavine, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers (NACDL), to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n
11 (Mar. 21, 2011) (“NACDL supports a comprehensive review of § 2B1.1, and urges
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By mid-summer, however, the Commission had backed off. In July
2011, the Commission identified among its proposed priorities for
2012 the continuation of its work implementing the directives of
Dodd-Frank and “any other crime legislation enacted during the
48
111th or 112th Congress warranting a Commission response.” This
fell well short of the comprehensive, multi-year review of § 2B1.1 previewed just five months earlier. And despite a number of comment
letters urging the Commission to reconsider its rejection of a com49
prehensive review, in September 2011, the Commission adopted the
50
narrower priority as proposed.
For the time being, then, it appears that the economic crimes
guideline’s “inordinate emphasis” on loss is not going anywhere. As
explained in the next Part, that decision is highly unfortunate.
III. LOSS, DISPARITY, AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The heavy emphasis on loss in the economic crimes guideline,
combined with the possibility of multiple additional enhancements
for overlapping offense characteristics, leads to particularly pernicious
forms of unwarranted disparity.
Several federal judges and commentators have observed that loss
is only a very rough barometer of an individual defendant’s culpabili51
ty. An earlier background note to § 2B1.1 accurately identified loss

the Commission not to respond to the directives before the current amendment
cycle ends on May 1, 2011.”).
48
See Notice of Proposed Priorities, 76 Fed. Reg. 45007, 45008 (July 27, 2011).
49
Several organizations submitted comment letters in August 2011 urging the
Commission to “maintain as a priority for the upcoming amendment cycle the ‘more
comprehensive review of Section 2B1.1 and related guidelines’ that [it] signaled earlier this year it was ready to undertake.” Letter from David Debold, Chair, and Eric A.
Tirschwell, Vice Chair, Practitioners Advisory Grp., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris,
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2 (Aug. 31, 2011); see also Letter from Thomas M.
Susman, Director, Gov’t Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to the Honorable Patti B. Saris 1
(Aug. 25, 2011); Letter from Miriam Conrad, Vice Chair, and Marjorie Meyers, Chair,
Fed. Defender Sentencing Guidelines Comm., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris 2-3
(Aug. 26, 2011). Indeed, even the Department reiterated its earlier call, noting that it
had previously “urged the Commission to review the guidelines for economic crimes
with a special focus on high-loss fraud cases.” Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant
Att’y Gen., and Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director, Office of Policy & Legislation, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable Patti B. Saris 6 (Sept. 2, 2011).
50
Notice of Final Priorities, 76 Fed. Reg. 58564 (Sept. 21, 2011).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Loss
under the Guidelines is effectively a proxy for evaluating culpability. Sometimes it is
appropriate, and sometimes it is not.”); United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d
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as something of a proxy for culpability because it reflected both “harm
52
to the victim” and “gain to the defendant.” The problem is that loss
has taken on a role in the sentence calculation that dwarfs most of the
other important factors.
No one could seriously doubt that, “[a]ll else being equal, large
thefts damage society more than small ones, create a greater temptation for potential offenders, and thus generally require greater de53
terrence and more serious punishment.” But rarely is all else even
close to equal, and that is where the current emphasis on loss leads to
unwarranted disparity.
The economic crimes guideline calls for use of either “actual” loss
or “intended” loss, whichever is higher. Actual loss might be higher
because of foreseeable pecuniary harms to the victims that the defendant did not intend to bring about. Intended loss might be higher
where the scheme is thwarted before it has a chance to succeed. But
even these simple distinctions raise serious questions about proportionality. If two defendants embark on identical schemes with identical
intended loss, why punish more severely the one who inflicted a higher
actual loss just because he happened to succeed? And if two defendants
engage in mortgage fraud, but only one has the fortuity of selling his
house and paying off his loan before market conditions unexpectedly
deteriorate, why punish more severely the one who started the crime a
few months later and therefore got stuck by the market downturn?
These are just two examples in which the amount of loss is driven by
54
factors unrelated to the defendant’s level of culpability.
It is worth pausing to note that the problem of disparity comes in
more than one form. We have just seen examples of “like” offenders
416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing the amount of loss as a “relatively weak indicator
of the moral seriousness of the offense or the need for deterrence”).
52
Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 155 n.10 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2001)).
53
Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
54
Another example is where co-conspirators trade on the same inside information
to purchase stock but hold onto that stock for different periods of time before selling.
See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1107 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J., dissenting)
(arguing that, in this case, the majority’s decision to determine gain from the crime at
the time of sale rather than from the amount derived from the insider trading leads to
“unequal justice for equal crimes”). Consider also Congress’s directive that health care
fraud should be sentenced under its own, more punitive definition of “intended loss,”
and that the resulting loss amounts should in turn result in greater punishment for
health care fraud than for all other types of fraud. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
10606(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 119, 1006 (2010) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994). As
George Orwell might have put it, when it comes to culpability, all frauds are equal, but
some are more equal than others. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM ch. 10 (1945).
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being treated differently for reasons unrelated to the purposes of punishment. The converse is no less worrisome: Defendants are often
treated the same under the economic crimes guideline even though the
purposes of punishment call for different treatment. Another name for
this is unwarranted uniformity. It happens under the economic crimes
guideline in a number of ways. For example, “we now have an advisory
guidelines regime where . . . any officer or director of virtually any public corporation who has committed securities fraud will be confronted
with a guidelines calculation either calling for or approaching lifetime
55
imprisonment.” In short, the economic crimes guideline does not
56
adequately distinguish Bernie Madoff from Richard Adelson.
But even in cases where the prescribed punishment falls short of a
life sentence, the loss table fails to differentiate offenders who ought
to be differentiated. For example, an amount of loss—especially when
it is actual loss—does not tell us anything about why the defendant
committed the offense or how much he personally benefited. These
motive-based facts are important for issues of retribution, deterrence,
and the need for incapacitation. Take an accountant at a public
company who is deliberately ignorant of a subordinate’s improper
bookkeeping. Assume that this defendant turns a blind eye because
he is afraid the company might miss its earnings target, and he is under great pressure not to let that happen in light of the negative reaction the year before when his honest reporting of a bookkeeping mistake caused the company to fall short. With a public company that
issues millions of shares, even small inflation in the price of a stock
can add up to tens of millions of dollars in loss. Even if this defendant
never sold any stock, and therefore never realized a penny of gain
from the fraud, the guidelines would treat him the same as a career
con man who creates a phony company, runs it as a Ponzi scheme,
pockets tens of millions in proceeds for his own benefit, and flees the

55

United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1002 (2010). Adelson, the
president of Impath, uncovered a sophisticated accounting fraud designed by other
Impath employees to inflate the value of the company’s stock. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Rakoff, J.). Relatively late in the conspiracy, Adelson chose to conceal the fraud rather than report it. Id.; see also Does Money Play Too Large a Role in Federal Sentencing?, CRIME IN THE SUITES (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://crimeinthesuites.com/does-money-play-too-large-a-role-in-federal-sentencing
(quoting Judge Rakoff’s description of Richard Adelson as a “very decent human being
who towards the end of a fraud perpetrated mostly by other people[] became involved
and made a mistake and covered it up”).
56
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country. Motive, intent, and personal gain are all important offense
characteristics that do not get accounted for in the guidelines.
Finally, the overemphasis on loss, both in proportion to other factors and as a driver of sentence severity, encourages a third disparity
less frequently characterized as such: the vastly dissimilar sentences
received by those who cooperate and those who exercise their Sixth
Amendment right to trial. Armed with the leverage of a draconian
guideline range driven by an aggressive loss calculation, the government can more readily extract guilty pleas in exchange for negotiated
charges and facts. For example, in exchange for a guilty plea, the
government may allow the defendant to plead to a charge with a rela57
tively low statutory maximum. One commentator has suggested that
“[t]his means of case resolution is the likely norm going forward” in
58
high-loss fraud cases. Alternatively, and more pertinently, the government may bargain away millions of dollars in loss by stipulating to
specific calculations—again, in exchange for guilty pleas. The coercive power of this tactic was not lost on Raj Rajaratnam, whose lawyers
pointed to the discrepancy between the amount of gain that the government initially alleged his cooperating co-conspirator had received,
and the significantly lower amount that the government stipulated to
in her plea agreement. Because he went to trial, Rajaratnam alleged,
the government had increased the amount of gain charged in the in59
dictment by $20 million.
57

See, e.g., United States v. Ovid, No. 09-216, 2010 WL 3940724, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 1, 2010) (“In exchange for Ovid’s plea of guilty to Count One, which carried a
five-year statutory maximum, the government agreed to dismiss other pending charges,
which exposed Ovid to an additional 40 years in prison.”); United States v. Watt, 707 F.
Supp. 2d 149, 151, 155 (D. Mass. 2010) (explaining that the government agreed to a
plea to a single count with a 60-month statutory maximum where advisory guidelines
sentence was life imprisonment, and imposing a 24-month term).
58
Hearings, supra note 4, at 7 n.22 (statement of James E. Felman); see also id.
(“Where the guidelines routinely call for a lifetime of imprisonment, a significant portion
of the sentencing function is transferred to the prosecutors who select the statutory maximum penalties of the counts to which the defendant will be permitted to plead guilty.”).
59
The Rajartnam team argued:
The “accidental” relationship of the gain amount to the defendant’s actual
culpability surely explains why the government is willing to bargain away millions of dollars of gain in order to obtain guilty pleas by stipulating to gain
calculations acceptable to both sides. For example, Mr. Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi were originally indicted together on charges of securities fraud
and conspiracy. The Superseding Indictment charged that Mr. Rajaratnam’s
conduct resulted in $45 million of gain to Galleon and that Ms. Chiesi’s conduct resulted in $4 million of gain to New Castle. But Ms. Chiesi’s plea
agreement stipulates that the amount of unlawful gain is less than $2.5 million—resulting in a Guidelines calculation 2 points lower than it would have
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Professor Bowman has correctly argued that the government’s willingness to afford steep sentencing discounts to cooperating defendants reflects not only a “reward for effective cooperation, but a sub
rosa acknowledgment by both prosecutors and the courts that the
starting point for departures in these cases should be far lower than
60
the Guidelines nominally require.” Judge Gleeson echoed this sup61
Whatever the government’s motivation, whiteposition in Ovid.
collar offenders who proceed to trial must be prepared to defend not
only against charges with significantly higher statutory maximums but
also against more aggressive and creative loss calculations. The government effectively acknowledged as much during the recent sentenc62
ing of lobbyist Kevin Ring.
IV. TARGETED SUGGESTIONS
Fortunately, a few relatively simple revisions could be made that
would reduce the economic crimes guideline’s overemphasis on loss
and consequent potential for unwarranted disparities.
First, amount of loss should simply be a less significant sentencing
input. One way to effect this change is to broaden the brackets of loss
amounts in the loss table and employ a progressively decreasing scale
in which each doubling of the loss amount has a smaller effect on the
63
offense level. There is no empirical basis for subdividing monetary
loss into sixteen different levels. One legal policy organization recently suggested that the Commission “should justify any cutoff between
the various levels of enhancement and should seek to tailor each level

been had she been held responsible for the $4 million charged in the indictment. In contrast, the government argues that Mr. Rajaratnam is responsible
for $63 million of gain, nearly $20 million more than charged in the indictment, resulting in a Guidelines calculation 2 points higher than it would have
been if the amount charged in the indictment had been used.
Rajaratnam Sent’g Memo., supra note 7, at 6 n.3 (citations omitted).
60
Bowman, supra note 3, at 170.
61
Ovid, 2010 WL 3940724, at *10 (“Perhaps, as in this case, the prosecutors who
are actually handling the cases in the courtrooms do not regard the sentences as unacceptable simply because they are below the advisory Guidelines ranges.”).
62
See United States v. Ring, No. 08-274, 2011 WL 4360005, at *4 n.9 (D.D.C.
Sept. 20, 2011) (quoting the government at oral argument as saying, “Mr. Ring
chose to proceed to trial, expend government resources, the court’s resources, and
the public’s resources and therefore is not similarly situated to others who pled
guilty early on in the investigation”).
63
Ellis et al., supra note 3, at 39-40.
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to an empirical rationale for the line drawn.” It may be that an
empirical rationale cannot be found, but that in itself would be a
highly useful piece of information when deciding how much weight
to give loss and how to make distinctions between different amounts.
If fewer distinctions are needed, then the Commission could also return to the pre-2001 approach of one-level increases from one lossamount bracket to the next.
Second, the Commission should cabin the scope of “intended
loss.” In United States v. Manatau, the Tenth Circuit recently held that
the amount of “intended loss” includes only those losses that are an object of the defendant’s specific purpose, not those that are merely “poss65
ible and potentially contemplated.” To the extent that the current
66
guideline can be read to permit a broader concept of “intended loss,”
the Commission should expressly endorse the Manatau definition.
Third, the amount of the defendant’s pecuniary gain should be a
more consequential sentencing input. Currently, a defendant’s gain
may be considered only if there was a loss that reasonably cannot be
determined; in other words, the defendant’s gain is used only as a
67
substitute measure for loss. But as the DOJ has acknowledged, cases in
which loss greatly exceeds a defendant’s gain are likely candidates for
68
below-guidelines variances. The Commission should revise the economic crimes guidelines to incorporate consideration of a defendant’s
pecuniary gain. As one possible approach, the American Bar Association has proposed simplified tables for loss and gain, “with the adjust69
ments from both tables applied cumulatively in appropriate cases.”
Fourth, and in a similar vein, the Commission should explore offense-level decreases or an offense-level cap in cases where loss greatly
exceeds a defendant’s gain. The drug guideline has a similar “mitigating role” cap for those who were minor or minimal participants in an
70
offense. Upon receiving a mitigating role adjustment, a drug defendant’s offense level is limited to an absolute ceiling, or decreased by
specified levels. Something similar could work under § 2B1.1. But ra64

Comments from Daniel J. Popeo & Michael P. Wilt, Wash. Legal Found., to the
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110826/Washington-LegalFoundation_PubComm_priorities.pdf.
65
647 F.3d 1048, 1048-49 (10th Cir. 2011).
66
See, e.g., United States v. Alli, 444 F.3d 34, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2006).
67
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, Application Note 3(B) (2011).
68
See Hearings, supra note 4, at 45 (response of Preet Bharara).
69
Letter from Thomas M. Susman, supra note 49, app. at 8.
70
See Letter from David Debold, supra note 49, at 3 (discussing § 2D1.1(a)(5)).

DEBOLDBENJAMIN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

156

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

12/12/2011 11:29 AM

[Vol. 160:141

ther than focus on whether the defendant was a minor or minimal
participant—which depends on whether others were more involved or
culpable—the cap or reduction under the economic crimes guideline
could be triggered where the amount of gain is very low in relation to
the loss amount that applies to the defendant. The Commission should
also consider revising the mitigating role guideline so that reductions
are available to those whose culpability is less than typical under the applicable offense guideline (e.g., § 2B1.1), rather than by comparing the
defendant to co-defendants involved in the same offense conduct.
Fifth, the Commission must rationalize the proliferation of overlapping specific offender characteristics in § 2B1.1. In addition to loss
amount, there are seventeen provisions—some with multiple parts—
that enhance sentences based on how the offense was committed. Not
only does one aspect of offense conduct often trigger two or more
enhancement provisions, but the guidelines also operate in such a way
that each additional factor has a larger effect on the sentence range
71
than those before it. The Commission itself has acknowledged this
phenomenon of “factor creep”: as “more and more adjustments are
added to the sentencing rules, it is increasingly difficult to ensure that
the interactions among them, and their cumulative effect, properly
72
track offense seriousness.”
Sixth, the economic crimes guideline explicitly permits a downward departure where a guidelines sentence “substantially overstates
73
the seriousness of the offense.” As one commentator has suggested,
the Commission should consider offering nonexclusive examples of
74
Though policy-based vasituations where this language applies.
riances would of course remain available, clarification would “offer
meaningful direction to district courts seeking to mitigate the severity
of the sentencing ranges produced under this guideline” and promote
75
the goals of consistency and transparency.
The sooner the Commission begins to address the problem of
overemphasis on loss amount in § 2B1.1, the sooner it will be possible
71

Having two enhancements of two levels each will mean that the top of the new
range is approximately twice the bottom of the beginning range, even if the starting
offense level is relatively high. For example, the bottom of the range for offense level
26 is 63 months, and the top is 78 months. At level 30, the range is 97 to 121 months.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (2011).
72
FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 17, at 137.
73
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.19(C) (2011).
74
See Stephen Kress, Revise U.S.S.G. Section 2B1.1, Application Note 19(c), 23 FED.
SENT’G REP. 271, 271 (2011).
75
Id.
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to draft appropriate language that mitigates the three types of unwarranted disparity experienced under that guideline. In the meantime,
sentencing courts will continue to have at their disposal the power to
vary from the guidelines when they determine that culpability is overstated and that various mitigating factors apply.
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